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SYMPOSIUM:
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE
LIBERAL STATE
INTRODUCTION
ROBERT K. VISCHERt
Even a cursory glance at a given day's newspaper headlines
suggests that religion and education are a combustible
combination.1 Whether one perceives American education as
having embraced a pervasive disrespect for traditional religious
belief or as having been victimized by the persistently brazen
intrusion of religious dogma, passions are stirred. This comes as
little surprise, for the intersection of religion and education
implicates our most fervently defended ideals: our conception of
life's meaning, and the well-being of our children. On one side of
the ideological divide, religion represents the background
against which any meaningful educational project must be
understood; on the other side, religion represents an
anachronistic threat to the child's proper formation.
In much of Europe, this volatility has been the impetus for
the modern state to consolidate its power over the articulation
and pursuit of educational norms. Whether a mandatory
secularist dress code, 2 or a universalist approach to sex
education,3 the brand of liberalism espoused in Europe seems to
be premised on minimizing the capacity of religion to cultivate a
vision of education that diverges from the state's.
t Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law; Fellow, Vincentian
Center for Church and Society.
1 See, e.g., Pete Shellem, Dover teachers may present evolution alternative,
HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, Jan. 6, 2005.
2 See Daniel Williams, Most comply with scarf ban but new French law draws
more criticism, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 3, 2004, at A18 (discussing France's new law
banning Muslim head coverings in public school).
3 Paul Hutcheon, Labour 'cave in' on Catholic sex education Ministers' bid to
exempt faith schools sparks fury, SUNDAY HERALD, Jan. 16, 2005, at 1.
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Americans cannot feign immunity to such a mindset, as it
has deep roots on these shores. Collective impositions of
secularism may not have found fertile ground here, but collective
impositions of the majority's religious norms have been common.
In the nineteenth century, state legislatures driven by anti-
Catholic animus enacted blanket prohibitions on government
funding of private schools. 4 In several states, private schooling
itself was outlawed.5  Such efforts amounted to a de facto
educational enshrinement of the dominant Protestant culture,
which manifested itself in the public school curriculum.
This majoritarian impulse was checked, at least in the
educational sphere, by the Supreme Court's robust conception of
due process and free exercise rights as applied to parental
decisions related to child-rearing. In Meyer v. Nebraska,6 the
Court struck down a state law banning the teaching of foreign
languages to students before they graduated from eighth grade,
reasoning that there was insufficient justification for state
interference "with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the
education of their own."7 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8 the
Court held that the state could not require parents to send their
children to public schools, for "[t]he fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only."9  Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 the Court
repelled the state's efforts to compel high school education for
Amish children on the ground that such efforts threatened the
group's religious liberty, recognizing that a "State's interest in
universal education" must be balanced against the reality that
"the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and
education of their children in their early and formative years
4 See generally Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and
Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (2003); Richard W. Garnett, The
Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 45 (2003).
5 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 395, 402 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 529-31 (1925).
6 262 U.S. 390.
7 Id. at 401.
8 268 U.S. 510.
9 Id. at 535.
10 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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have a high place in our society."" Together, this triumvirate
has been understood to establish space in which divergent
visions of education may be pursued with minimal state
intrusion.
Built on this foundation of constitutional protections, the
American educational marketplace offers a vast array of options,
but only to those families who can afford to pay for them. Driven
in part by an effort to extend meaningful educational choice to
all students, the school voucher movement has heated up
debates over state involvement in religious education.
Proponents of religious education generally resist any
significantly increased state regulation of private schools, even of
those private schools accepting state voucher funds. Others see
vouchers as a potential vehicle by which to allow the government
to begin regulating the illiberal religious content espoused at
traditional Catholic, Muslim, Jewish and evangelical Christian
schools. Even religion-friendly politicians see some role for
government regulation of voucher schools. They, like many
Americans, are uncomfortable allowing a school receiving
government funds to deny students admission based on religion,
or to fire openly gay teachers, or to teach students that women
are subservient to men. Compounding the concern is the
perception that young students, lacking the knowledge or
authority to exercise authentic educational choice themselves,
are best served by the imposition of state standards.
The school vouchers debate thus leads to more fundamental
questions about religion and education in this country. Should
the provision of education proceed in keeping with a marketplace
model, maximizing parents' freedom of choice among a full range
of pedagogical, religious, and ideological approaches? Or do
children's own interests demand that the state place limits on
the educational choices available to parents? Are there certain
non-negotiable educational norms mandated by our collective
notions of individual autonomy and equality? If so, to what
extent are these norms inconsistent with the values inculcated
within the long educational traditions of this country's faith
communities?
This symposium is premised on the belief that such
questions can best be answered by straightforward engagement
11 Id. at 213-14.
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with the views on education espoused by our various faith
communities, and that these views are presented at their most
authentic through the lens offered by the understanding and
experience of the community's own members. The robust
articulation of the various strands of religious education, in turn,
facilitates more meaningful exploration of modern liberalism's
expectations. The exercise is not premised on the presumed
validity of liberal norms, but on the importance of understanding
the relationship between liberal and religious educational norms.
Seen in this light, the following essays are best seen as part
of a broader conversation aimed at deepening our common
understanding of education's aims. The conversation ideally will
multiply the points of connection across our red-blue divide, but
short of that, value is to be found in a richer, more nuanced
disagreement. Rather than talking at each other from afar in
language unfamiliar, often unrecognizable, the participants in
this symposium have brought their distinct worldviews to bear
on a single task: articulating-in a normative, aspirational
sense-the relationship between religious education and the
liberal state.
The symposium centers on the work of James Dwyer, whose
skepticism toward a reflexive embrace of parental rights has
opened up new fronts in the debate over religion and education.12
Building on a Rawlsian understanding of liberalism, Dwyer has
constructed a theoretical framework for the proposition that the
state must take a more aggressive role in protecting children's
well-being, and that such well-being must embody certain
universally applicable ideals of human flourishing, regardless of
the religious convictions that may hold sway over child-rearing
decisions in a given family. Unlike many liberal theorists,
Dwyer welcomes-indeed demands-the widespread
implementation of school vouchers, as he recognizes their
potential to improve the quality of the secular education
provided at the many religious schools that currently lack
adequate resources. Dwyer also sees the regulatory strings
accompanying vouchers as playing a valuable role in ensuring
that children are not precluded from meaningful self-
12 See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON: A CHILD-CENTERED
APPROACH TO EDUCATION REFORM (2002); JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V.
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public
Into the Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963 (2001).
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development simply by the accident of their birth into a family
that rejects the educational promises of modern liberalism.
Dwyer's proposition, of course, has not been met with open
arms in all circles. Critics insist that Dwyer's vision threatens to
elevate a distant, faceless state bureaucracy over the intimacy
and immediacy of parental love as the locus of child-rearing
authority. Others claim that Dwyer's secularized conception of a
child's best interests reflects an eviscerated understanding of the
human person, and that his argument that the healthy
formation of children is compromised in some religious traditions
emanates from a caricature of religious education. The
symposium's participants now have the opportunity to
supplement Dwyer's portrayal of liberalism's expectations of
religious education with their own understandings of religion's
expectations of education.
Michael Scaperlanda, writing from the Roman Catholic
tradition, argues that Dwyer's framework is grounded in
anthropological presumptions that ignore the spiritual
dimension of the human person. He extols the virtues of
Catholic education as deriving from a holistic conception of the
person, embracing and shaping body, mind, and spirit. By
marginalizing the educational relevance of the spiritual,
Scaperlanda fears that Dwyer's brand of liberalism stands to
produce children who are disconnected from their true selves.
David Smolin sets out the requirements and objectives of a
sound education from the perspective of evangelical Christianity.
One obvious source of tension with modern liberalism is
evangelicalism's covenantal approach to child-raising, under
which parents and their chosen agents are charged by God with
teaching children self-mastery through the enforcement of fixed
moral and ethical norms. Smolin sees the viability of this
approach threatened by Dwyer's call for the state to ensure each
child's moral autonomy. He finds Dwyer's secularist framework
to be more than inhospitable to the evangelical vision; he takes it
as a call for cultural genocide.
Islam, in Asma Afsaruddin's view, has a rich educational
tradition that in many ways shares liberalism's emphasis on
critical thinking skills. Buttressed by a sweeping historical
overview, Afsaruddin suggests that liberal values such as
tolerance, pluralism, and equality are evident in the Islamic
tradition, and provide a basis for optimism going forward. In
2005]
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this sense, Afsaruddin seeks not to challenge the substance of
the educational values articulated by modern liberalism, but
instead implicitly questions the premise that such values need to
be transplanted from outside the Islamic tradition.
Michael Broyde emphasizes Judaism's conception of
education as a lifelong obligation, equally applicable to children
and adults. Modern liberalism, by contrast, appears preoccupied
with the education of children as a matter of right, eviscerating
the demands that education rightfully places on its citizenry.
Rather than extracting from the Jewish tradition a defensive
stance toward the state, Broyde mines his tradition for
standards that call the state and its citizenry to expect even
more from education.
Finally, Dwyer responds to these religious perspectives by
revisiting his call for certain non-negotiable educational norms
to be articulated and enforced by the state. He focuses his
attention on the absence of compelling justifications for allowing
parents' religiously shaped preferences to deprive children of the
tools necessary to develop their own autonomy. Emphasizing
that his approach does not call for transforming children into
"creatures of the state," Dwyer recasts parental authority as a
fiduciary relationship akin to stewardship, rather than an
absolutist exercise of constitutionally protected power. At the
boundaries, parental authority is checked by state authority.
The objective, in Dwyer's view, is not to produce generations of
state-approved, cookie-cutter children, but to ensure that
children have the opportunity to define and pursue their own
conceptions of the good.
None of the essays appearing in this volume are inconsistent
with the marketplace model of education. The essays suggest
that the authors would not deny the value of offering a full range
of educational choices when it comes to the development of young
people. Disagreements arise not so much as to the importance of
choice, but as to who should exercise the choice. One vision of
education maintains that parents are the relevant decision-
makers because the child's best interests are intimately
connected to the parents' understanding of the child's best
interests, and that the parents are entitled to select an
educational path that leads the child in a direction that is
consistent with the family's worldview, beliefs, and traditions.
The other view discounts familial context in constructing a vision
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of the child's best interests, focusing on the child's prerogative to
control her own destiny, and insists that the child must be
equipped with the skills and opportunities to exercise a
meaningful choice whether or not to follow in the ways of her
parents.
The complication underlying this debate, of course, arises
from the fact that children cannot identify or articulate their
own interests, much less discern how those interests relate to a
particular school's environment and curriculum. As such,
decision-making authority must rest somewhere: the current
debate turns on the respective roles we envision for parents and
for the state. In the end, the greater the degree of parental
liberty in the educational sphere, the greater sway religion may
have over the shaping of children; to the extent that the state
provides boundaries on education, religion is not left out of the
equation, but its role is circumscribed by liberal norms.
By no means does this symposium purport to present an
easy or obvious bridge between these perspectives; its aspiration
is simply to provide a deeper understanding of the debate, and a
richer appreciation of its stakes.
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